Minor accident today

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  • #931686
    consularrider
    Participant

    CCrew’s discussion has been very useful, because this was one of the points the Arlington Police Chief was making during our discussion at the Lynn/Lee crossing in September. That’s the way he and the other Arlington Police officer were interpreting the law. Distressingly, he was also saying the cyclist who enters the intersection before a car turning from the same street for a left or right cross/left or right hook, could also be found at fault (made no sense at the time or after further reflection). That was the situation of the cyclist struck there in August who received a warning ticket from best anyone could tell.

    #931692
    eminva
    Participant

    @consularrider 9845 wrote:

    CCrew’s discussion has been very useful, because this was one of the points the Arlington Police Chief was making during our discussion at the Lynn/Lee crossing in September. That’s the way he and the other Arlington Police officer were interpreting the law. Distressingly, he was also saying the cyclist who enters the intersection before a car turning from the same street for a left or right cross/left or right hook, could also be found at fault (made no sense at the time or after further reflection). That was the situation of the cyclist struck there in August who received a warning ticket from best anyone could tell.

    This is a good point and I had the same impression from the meeting. To paraphrase, I understood his position to be that the cyclist is in the best position to avoid an accident, and thus the onus is on the cyclist to do so. I think unfortunately it doesn’t matter what the statute says if the first line of enforcement takes this attitude.

    Although I am admitted to practice in the Commonwealth (and I know I’m not the only one), I have been loathe to wade into this debate, because traffic law is so far from my area of expertise and interpretation of any statutory provision hinges on so much beyond the plain language. I noticed that one of the speakers at the WABA summit next Thursday will be an attorney who is addressing the legal rights of cyclists. For anyone attending the event, it might be worth putting the question we’ve been debating to him, if he is taking questions.

    Liz

    #931693
    Arlingtonrider
    Participant

    Bruce Deming, the Virginia lawyer speaking at the WABA summit, is well worth hearing for anyone who can manage to attend. He is very knowledgeable and experienced in personal injury law relating to bicyclists, and I think is working on a book about it. I understand from a mutual friend that he is also an accomplished mountain biker. WABA sponsored a great program that I attended a couple of months ago with three excellent bike lawyers from the area, and Bruce was one of them. These guys know each other and share their courtroom experiences, so when they talk you get expertise gleaned from many sources. I wish I could attend the summit but I can’t. I hope those who can will take advantage of the opportunity.

    #931694
    DismalScientist
    Participant

    Am I to interpret this as saying that I must anticipate potential bonehead maneuvers by drivers before entering the crosswalk even when the light indicates I have the right of way? Furthermore, these anticipated bonehead maneuvers can commence even after I entered the crosswalk? Ouch… Ride defensively everyone.

    #931698
    acc
    Participant

    Although I am admitted to practice in the Commonwealth (and I know I’m not the only one), I have been loathe to wade into this debate, because traffic law is so far from my area of expertise and interpretation of any statutory provision hinges on so much beyond the plain language.

    Liz

    According to the little card in my wallet I can practice law but in reality having me represent you would guarantee your swift conviction, a long stay as a guest of the state, and quite likely your deportation even if you were born and raised in Arlington County. That being said, the discussion/presentation at the Death Zone last September left me with the following take away point that I immediately had tattooed on my forearm for easy reference:

    The cyclist is always wrong.

    Argue or don’t argue the *finer* points of the law. Paranoia and the belief that every driver exists in a vegetative state has kept me alive so far.

    Please make it stop raining,
    ann

    #931701
    elcee
    Participant

    @DismalScientist 9854 wrote:

    Am I to interpret this as saying that I must anticipate potential bonehead maneuvers by drivers before entering the crosswalk even when the light indicates I have the right of way? Furthermore, these anticipated bonehead maneuvers can commence even after I entered the crosswalk? Ouch… Ride defensively everyone.

    Actually, that’s my mantra when I drive as well.

    #931707
    WillStewart
    Participant

    Just found out last night that the young woman driver is a cycling enthusiast herself, and was hit by a car once as well. She’s being reallly hard on herself.

    #931766
    Mark Blacknell
    Participant

    Perhaps interesting to those playing along at home:

    593 S.E.2d 201
    267 Va. 458
    Howell RUSS
    v.
    James DESTIVAL.
    Record No. 030892.
    Supreme Court of Virginia.
    March 5, 2004.

    Edward L. Weiner (Lawson D. Spivey, III; Weiner & Associates, on brief), Fairfax, for appellant.
    Julia B. Judkins (Trichilo, Bancroft, McGavin, Horvath & Judkins, on brief), Fairfax, for appellee.
    Present: All the Justices.
    KINSER, Justice.

    The sole question in this appeal is whether a jury instruction stating that a bicyclist has a duty to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection in disregard of “close or approaching” traffic is an inaccurate statement of law. In light of the plain terms of Code 46.2-924(B), we answer that question in the affirmative and thus conclude that the circuit court erred in granting the instruction.

    Howell Russ, the appellant, filed a motion for judgment against James Destival, the appellee, claiming damages for personal injuries allegedly sustained as a result of an accident that occurred at the intersection between Braddock Road and Prestwick Drive in Fairfax County. Russ was riding a bicycle westbound along a path that runs adjacent to Braddock Road and, as he proceeded across Prestwick Drive, he was struck by an automobile driven by Destival.1

    Braddock Road is a four-lane highway divided by a median strip. Prestwick Drive is a two-lane street that provides ingress and egress to a residential neighborhood and has a posted speed limit, according to Russ, of 25 miles per hour. As Destival traveled along Prestwick Drive and approached the intersection between these two roads, he came to a stop sign and white “stop line” at the end of Prestwick Drive. According to his trial testimony, Destival stopped his vehicle behind the white line but then “eased” his vehicle forward, beyond the white line, to within six to eight feet of the eastbound lanes of Braddock Road in order to see oncoming traffic more clearly. He intended to turn left and proceed westbound on Braddock Road. When he accelerated forward to cross the eastbound lanes to the median, he heard a yell and a “large thud.” Destival admitted that he never saw Russ before the impact.

    Russ testified that, as he approached the intersection in question, he saw Destival’s vehicle come to a stop beyond the white line “but not in the path of the bike path.” He stated that Destival’s vehicle “roll[ed] through the stop sign and stop[ped] just before the end of the bike path.” Russ admitted that he never stopped his bicycle before crossing Prestwick Drive in front of Destival’s vehicle.

    During argument on jury instructions, Destival offered Jury Instruction Q, which stated:

    A bicyclist has a duty to use ordinary care when he is riding on or crossing the hard surface of a highway:
    (1) to keep a lookout for motor vehicles;
    [593 S.E.2d 203]
    (2) to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection or the hard surface of a highway in disregard of traffic which is close or approaching in such a manner that a reasonable person would not attempt to enter or cross; and
    (3) to step or move from his course into a place of safety if it reasonably appears to him that he is in danger of being struck by a motor vehicle.
    If a bicyclist fails to perform any one or more of these duties, then he is negligent. Destival had modified the instruction from its original version to include the word “close” in subsection 2.

    The circuit court granted the jury instruction over Russ’ objection, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Destival.

    Russ filed a motion to set aside the jury verdict and enter judgment in his favor, or in the alternative, to grant him a new trial. The circuit court denied Russ’ motion. This Court granted Russ an appeal limited to the following assignment of error:
    The court erred in its rulings regarding the jury instructions on the appropriate law, and further in failing to grant the plaintiff judgment notwithstanding the verdict on these grounds.
    A. The court erred when it approved defendant’s Instruction Q, as modified by the defendant, as it was an inaccurate and misleading statement of Virginia law.

    As Destival correctly argues, the sole issue before us is whether Instruction Q was a correct statement of Virginia law. Any question about whether that instruction was applicable to the facts of this case is not encompassed within the assignment of error. Thus, we will confine this opinion to the narrow issue raised by Russ’ assignment of error. See Wolfe v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 260 Va. 7, 14-15, 532 S.E.2d 621, 624-25 (2000) (we do not consider arguments that are not the subject of an assignment of error).

    Russ’ contention that Instruction Q was an inaccurate statement of law focuses on the insertion of the word “close” in subsection 2. He contends that the instruction as modified altered the provisions of Code § 46.2-924 establishing a pedestrian’s right-of-way and that the jury was thus presented with an inaccurate legal standard regarding his duty of care.

    The relevant provisions of Code § 46.2-904 state that “[a] person riding a bicycle . . . on a sidewalk, shared-use path, or across a roadway on a crosswalk, shall have all the rights and duties of a pedestrian under the same circumstances.”2 A pedestrian’s right-of-way vis-a-vis a vehicle is set forth in Code § 46.2-924(A):
    A. The driver of any vehicle on a highway shall yield the right-of-way to any pedestrian crossing such highway:
    1. At any clearly marked crosswalk, whether at mid-block or at the end of any block;3
    2. At any regular pedestrian crossing included in the prolongation of the lateral boundary lines of the adjacent sidewalk at the end of a block;
    3. At any intersection when the driver is approaching on a highway or street where the legal maximum speed does not exceed thirty-five miles per hour.

    However, Code § 46.2-924(B) states, in pertinent part, that “[n]o pedestrian shall enter or cross an intersection in disregard of approaching traffic.” This latter provision is determinant of the issue in this appeal.

    Subsection 2 of Instruction Q informed the jury that a bicyclist has a duty to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection in disregard of traffic that is either “close or approaching.” The addition of the word “close” altered the statutory duty of a bicyclist. The provisions of Code § 924(B) require a bicyclist to refrain from entering or crossing an intersection in disregard of “approaching traffic.” The statute does not include traffic that is “close.” To state in a jury instruction that a bicyclist must refrain from entering or crossing an intersection in disregard of traffic that is “close,” i.e., stopped, runs afoul of the plain terms of Code § 46.2-924(B) and a pedestrian’s right-of-way established in subsection A of that statute.

    Contrary to Destival’s argument, this Court’s decisions in which we have used words such as “near,” “in close proximity,” “close,” or “dangerously near” in describing those vehicles that a pedestrian should see and heed do not support a different result. In Hopson v. Goolsby, 196 Va. 832, 839, 86 S.E.2d 149, 153 (1955) (quoting Hooker v. Hancock, 188 Va. 345, 356, 49 S.E.2d 711, 716 (1948)), we stated that “if a person having a duty to look `carelessly undertakes to cross without looking, or, if looking, fails to see or heed traffic that is obvious and in dangerous proximity and continues on into its path, he is guilty of negligence as a matter of law.'” Accord Carson v. LeBlanc, 245 Va. 135, 140, 427 S.E.2d 189, 192 (1993); Cofield v. Nuckles, 239 Va. 186, 190, 387 S.E.2d 493, 495 (1990); Straughan v. Nash, 215 Va. 627, 632, 212 S.E.2d 280, 283 (1975). Elaborating on a pedestrian’s duty to keep a lookout for vehicles, we explained that “[t]he duty of looking is based on the wisdom of seeing whether traffic is approaching, where and at what speed” and “f looking discloses approaching traffic, then the right to proceed is to be tested by whether a person of ordinary prudence would attempt it.” Hopson, 196 Va. at 839, 86 S.E.2d at 153 (citing Rhoades v. Meadows, 189 Va. 558, 562, 54 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1949)). These cases and the others cited by Destival emphasizing a pedestrian’s duty to see and heed “approaching” traffic are consistent with the directive in Code § 46.2-924(B) requiring a pedestrian not to enter or cross an intersection in disregard of “approaching traffic.” They do not alter a pedestrian’s duty in that instance.

    Thus, we hold that Instruction Q was not an accurate statement of Virginia law and that the circuit court erred in giving the instruction to the jury.4 Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this case for further proceedings.

    Reversed and remanded.

    Notes:
    1. Russ was towing a trailer in which his three-year-old son was riding.
    2. In light of the statute, we will use the terms “bicyclist” and “pedestrian” interchangeably.
    The term “crosswalk” is defined as “that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; or any portion of a roadway at an intersection or else-where distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface.” Code § 46.2-100.
    3. The pictures introduced into evidence demonstrate that there was not a marked crosswalk at the intersection of Braddock Road and Prestwick Drive.
    4. We express no opinion regarding whether Instruction Q without the modification applies to the facts of this case or whether, in a new trial, the circuit court should give such an instruction to the jury.

    #931810
    WillStewart
    Participant

    Mark, I believe what you’ve posted addresses all the aspects of this particular thread quite completely.

    #931821
    CCrew
    Participant

    Looks to me that it was a case that was remanded to the lower court on appeal due to a faulty jury instruction. Will be interesting to see how people claim that it bolsters their argument here..Because until it got remanded, the cyclist had been found negligent.

    And considering it was a Supreme Court of VA decision remanding it he got found negligent at several lower levels to boot.

    #931826
    MCL1981
    Participant

    The situation is not even remotely the same. But none the less, being found negligent at several lower levels is meaningless with the faulty jury instructions. So point is moot.

    Based on the limited description provided in this briefing, his argument for appeal is absolutely correct. You can’t just modify the law to be more fitting for your court case. As for who was right and who was wrong, it could go either way. I think they were both wrong. The driver was wrong for not yielding to the cyclist. The cyclist was wrong for assuming a car stopped at a stop sign was indeed waiting for him to pass by and blowing through the intersection on that assumption. They should both be assigned blame and be kicked out of the court for wasting our time and money. This is nothing at all like the OP’s accident.

    #931835
    Mark Blacknell
    Participant

    The certainty in this thread is quite something.

    #931842
    CCrew
    Participant

    @Mark Blacknell 10003 wrote:

    The certainty in this thread is quite something.

    Amen. Especially given previous threads about how “contributory negligence” works.

    I was just certain someone wouldn’t be able to read that and would use it to justify their own preconcieved notion. I was right :)

    Not that I really have any skin in the game anyway. I come through that area at 3:00am and blow every stop at about 20mph :p Every time I cross a crosswalk I do hear the angels sing and even the rabbits stop for me. :)

    #931844
    Arlingtonrider
    Participant

    Can anyone provide any general insight as to how contributory negligence is applied in Virginia and/or DC, as a practical matter? (Recognizing that every case is different, not a legal opinion, etc.)

    #931845
    CCrew
    Participant

    @Arlingtonrider 10012 wrote:

    Can anyone provide any general insight as to how contributory negligence is applied in Virginia and/or DC, as a practical matter? (Recognizing that every case is different, not a legal opinion, etc.)

    From Nolo:
    “contributory negligence
    A doctrine of common law that if a person’s own negligence contributes to causing an accident in which that person is injured, the injured party can’t collect any damages (money) from another party who caused the accident. Because this doctrine often ended in unfair results (where a person only slightly negligent was prohibited from recovering damages from a person who was much more so), most states now use a comparative negligence test instead, in which the relative percentages of negligence by each person are used to determine how much the injured person recovers.”

    VA, MD and the District by law use contributory negligence vs the less stringent (and more realistic) relative negligence benchmark. In essence, if it can be proven that you in any way didn’t do something correctly even 1% it negates your ability to win a tort claim. And that “prove” part is abnormally broad reaching.

    Generally how it’s handled:

    http://www.contributorynegligence.net/

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